Thursday, September 08, 2005
(2:24 PM) | Brad:
And People Ask Why My Thesis Isn't Finished Yet
A couple of months ago, it was recommended that I read Andrew J. Bacevich's The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by war. Bacevich was formerly an officer in the US Army, and went on to become Professor of International Relations at Boston University. Very early in the book, he argues that the best hope for cultural & political dissent in this country comes from 'the old Right' & 'the far Left', and identifies himself as very much a part of the former. The problem, as he sees it, is that since the 1970s, in the aftermath of the Vietnam disaster, a series of seemingly unrelated transformations took place in the military, in political discourse, and in religious ideology and formed the roots of America's modern 'militarism'.The OED definition Bacevich here for 'militarism' cites is helpful:
The spirit and tendencies of the professional soldier; the prevalence of military sentiments or ideals among a people; the political condition characterized by the predominance of the military class in government or administration; the tendency to regard military efficiency as the paramount interest of the state.
Basically, what happens is that civilians and soliders alike have come to regard the military class as qualitatively different from the rest of society. Soldiers are held up as paragons of virtue, heroism, and all that is good & right about America. Thus the common sentiment: 'We [the wanton civilians] don't deserve our military.' In abstracting their role and place in society, the military (for citizens) very easy becomes indistinguishable from 'military power & power projection'.*
The War on Terror, Bacevich continues, is simply one component of an existing war begun in 1980, by, of all people, Jimmy Carter. In the so-called Carter Doctrine, which declared the centrality of the Persian Gulf (namely, of its oil) to its geopolitical aims, America effectively entered WW IV. (WW III, aka the Cold War, was at this stage slowly winding down, with most insiders recognizing, albeit not openly admitting, that the likelihood of a head-to-head war with the USSR was increasingly far-fetched). What Carter started, Reagan fully realized, and very deftly managed to publically fight (and, so goes the myth, end) WW III, whilst never losing sight of the sporadic events that gave public face to WW IV. His investment would pay off almost immediately after he left office: i.e., in Operation Desert Storm in 1990. We will recall, of course, that the latter occurred within months of the fall of the Berlin Wall -- a time when many began to wonder about the necessity of American military investment. With Desert Storm, America's involvement in WW IV was thus solidified. Furthermore, it was maintained under Bill Clinton; and it was expanded indefinitely under Bush, Jr. after 9/11.
With each successive stage, Bacevich argues, the militarization of society is ever more deeply engrained, to the point where even the most basic inquiry into America's assumptions re: the size of the military is functionally impossible. Disagreements remain as to HOW & WHEN the Iraq War was fought, for example, but a serious debate about the nature of the military (i.e., whether its size, reach, and immanent influence on most of the world is, in fact, in the nation's best interest) simply cannot be broached.
On a critical note, I do not think Bacevich fully appreciates the economic aspect to the problem he describes, and thus fails to come to terms with what globalism actually means. Too often he regards it simply as descriptive of a reality that contemporary America cannot deny; but does not largely fails to recognize it as a complex CONSTITUTIVE REALITY of the modern world. This would have made for a very different analysis, and likely would have enriched his reading of what was really happening during the Clinton administration, and likely put his understanding of WW IV in a different context.
Bacevich's book is very dark, even with his few attempts at weird humor. He offers some suggestions in the final chapter, but nowhere else offers any sense that they might actually be effective or even possible. (Again, I think a lot of this has to do with his overall conservatism and lack of vision, re: globalism.) His, in the end, is not so much a prescription, but a very interesting diagnosis.
* Bacevich points out that this was definitely not the role sought for itself by the military in the reforms of the 70s & 80s. In fact, he argues persuasively that the opposite was the case: the professionalization & expansion of the all-volunteer, post-Vietnam Army was originally envisioned simply as a means to maintain its identity & relevance, and to never fight wars of indefinite length & ambition ever again. So much for that last part.
